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Abstract
Based on agency theory, this paper contributes to the literature by assessing the effects of Supervisory Board size, gender 
diversity, and multiple directorship on performance within the banking industry of the small island developing state: Curacao. 
The research made use of the data drawn from annual reports of locally generated banks and its subsidiaries. Results from linear 
regressions indicate a positive relationship between multiple directorship and bank performance, and a negative association 
between bank outcomes and both gender diversity and board size. According to these results, it is concluded that the legislation 
on corporate governance for credit institutions in Curacao should incorporate a maximum number of members on the board, as 
well as promote interlocking directorates and quotas by gender. 
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Composición del Consejo de Administración y desempeño bancario en un pequeño estado insular en desarrollo: el caso 
de Curazao 
Resumen
Basado en la teoría de agencias, este documento contribuye a la literatura al evaluar los efectos del tamaño del Consejo de 
Administración, la diversidad de género y los directorios múltiples en el desempeño de los bancos en Curazao. Se utilizaron datos 
de informes anuales de bancos locales y sus subsidiarias. Los resultados de las regresiones lineales indican una relación positiva 
entre los directorios múltiples y el desempeño del banco, y una asociación negativa entre los resultados del banco y la diversidad de 
género y el tamaño del directorio. Se recomienda que la legislación sobre gobierno corporativo para bancos en Curazao incorpore un 
número máximo de miembros en el Consejo, así como promueva los directorios múltiples y las cuotas por género.
Palabras clave: tamaño del consejo de administración; directorios múltiples; diversidad de género; desempeño bancario; Curazao. 
Composição do Conselho de Administração e desempenho bancário em um pequeno estado insular em 
desenvolvimento: o caso de Curaçao 
Resumo
Com base na teoria da agência, este trabalho contribui para a literatura avaliando os efeitos do tamanho do Conselho de Administração, 
a diversidade de gênero e os múltiplos diretórios sobre o desempenho dos bancos em Curaçao. Foram utilizados dados de relatórios 
anuais de bancos locais e suas subsidiárias. Os resultados das regressões lineares indicam uma relação positiva entre os diretórios 
múltiplos e o desempenho do banco, e uma associação negativa entre o desempenho dos bancos e a diversidade de gênero e o 
tamanho do diretório. É recomendável que a legislação de governança corporativa para bancos em Curaçao incorpore um número 
máximo de membros no Conselho, assim como promova múltiplos diretórios e cotas por gênero.
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1. Introduction
Corporate Governance can be defined as 
arrangements intended to align company objectives 
and ensure that the rights of firm stakeholders are 
not violated (John & Senbet, 1998). The Corporate 
Governance framework is comprised of three basic 
components, namely: contracts to align objectives, 
procedures to resolve conflicts of interest, and 
supervision mechanisms.
The Supervisory Board of an entity is accountable 
for the behavior of the firm and controls the company’s 
general policies (Centrale Bank, 2001). The effective-
ness of a Supervisory Board is highly dependent on 
how well directors work together as well as individual-
ly (Centrale Bank, 2001). Therefore, the board should 
continually evaluate its efficiency and take the proper 
steps to enhance its performance. Alongside the requi-
red knowledge, the board composition – Board Size, 
Multiple Directorships, and Gender Diversity, among 
others – are factors that impact the Supervisory Board 
as a whole and may influence the effectiveness and the 
decision-making process. For instance, small boards 
have been positively related with company results 
(Yermack, 1996), as it is easier to reach consensus, 
make decisions, and monitor the firm; Multiple Direc-
torships can help the organizational performance 
because board members linking a firm to its external 
environment can foster access to critical information 
and valuable resources that help reduce asymmetric 
information for strategic actions (Beckman, Haunschild, 
& Phillips, 2004), the same argument can be expanded 
to companies´ CEOs interactions (McDonald and West-
phal, 2003). Gender Diversity on boards can promote 
a more optimistic environment, extend dialogues on 
strategic matters, and decrease conflicts and agency 
costs (Wilson, Wright, & Scholes, 2013).
All companies, no matter size, public or private, 
long standing, or recent startups should be properly 
informed and pay attention to good governance 
practices, as Corporate Governance has become impe-
rative to the business world. There is no debate that 
Corporate Governance practices have an impact on the 
performance and long-term viability of a firm (Kose & 
Senbet, 1998); however, it is important to find the right 
balance concerning Corporate Governance practices, 
as all practices do not fit all.
An efficient financial sector contributes to a better 
standard of living by reducing the risk and costs 
associated with the production and trading of goods 
and services (Herring & Santomero, 1995). Good Cor-
porate Governance in the banking industry is of great 
importance and will continue to increase given the risk 
and challenges the banking industry permanently faces 
(Herring & Santomero, 1995). It is vital to protect the 
interests of the stakeholders, improve transparency 
and compliance with the law and increase bank 
performance.
Following the financial scandals of WorldCom and 
Enron in 2002 and the global financial crisis in 2008, 
the importance of Corporate Governance continues to 
grow. Many supervisory entities dedicated a substantial 
amount of time and resources towards the develop-
ment of sound Corporate Governance policies. In addi-
tion to the OECD’s efforts, the Basel Committee has 
been effective in obtaining information from collective 
supervisory experience of the Basel members and other 
supervisory authorities to issue specific guidance in 
this topic in efforts to promote safe and sound banking 
policies (Basel Committee, 2015a).
Over the past few years, the Central Bank of Curacao 
and Sint Maarten has been vigorously encouraging 
Corporate Governance in the financial sector (Centrale 
Bank, 2001). Both Guidance Notes for the Board of 
Directors of Supervised Financial Institutions, and 
a concise document of Best Practices Guidelines 
on Corporate Governance were introduced in 1996 
(Centrale Bank, 2001), the Guidance Notes enclosed 
the legal obligations of directors, the role of the audit 
committee, and the conventional responsibilities of 
the board. The Best Practice Guidelines comprised 
a discussion and presentation of various systems, 
policies and measures useful in coping with Corporate 
Governance issues within financial institutions. The 
Central Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten requires an 
annual statement of Compliance with Best Practices 
guidelines on Corporate Governance, these guidelines 
should be prepared by the board of directors of all 
supervised financial institutions and naturally reviewed 
by an accounting firm to be valid. The Central Bank of 
Curacao and Sint Maarten measures the Corporate 
Governance improvements through on-site examina-
tions and through reviewing the statement of complian-
ce provided, besides, the Central Bank’s rules and 
regulations further comprise a periodic management 
report, which entails a briefing by management on the 
performance of a bank and the reflection of the future 
direction of the institution, supervisory regulation 
related to extension of credit to persons directly related 
to the institution, and supervisory regulation related to 
restrictions on transactions and limitations to exten-
sion of credit (Tromp, 2019).
Board composition and its effect on Firm 
Performance has been one of the Corporate Governance 
topics that have been brought forth in many studies. 
Nevertheless, as far as the authors have investigated, 
there is no research done in this area for Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS); these are a diverse cluster 
of 52 developing countries fronting particular social, 
economic, and environmental vulnerabilities (UN-
OHRLLS, 2013). Curacao is a small island and one of 
the challenges, as mentioned in the article of Frielink 
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(2017), is that there should be less discretion when 
appointing people in important positions, such that the 
interests of companies and stakeholders are protected 
and the firms can be successful in the long run. Having 
the proper supervision is vital in such cases; however, 
to achieve that, the best practices ranging from Board 
Size, Gender Diversity to Multiple Directorships, should 
be known to ensure having an efficient and effective 
board (Matroos-Lasten, 2019). 
A challenge of a small island economy such as 
Curacao is that the companies are usually smaller com-
pared to other economies and therefore occasionally 
have a less demanding structure, which often makes it 
more challenging in terms of good Governance (Minto-
Coy, Lashley, & Storey, 2018; Sannegadu, Henrico, & 
van Staden, 2021). Another challenge is separating 
personal relationships from business matters (Goede, 
2008). Having the correct social contacts in the recent 
years have grown in importance; as social relations 
are informal it has become difficult for some to sepa-
rate personal relations from business issues. Others 
question if the decisions made within the companies 
are based on personal interests or based on the best 
interests for the stakeholders. According to the agency 
theory, a principal-agent conflict will derive from the 
separation between ownership and control (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976); the magnitude of agency conflicts 
in a company is contingent to the institutional setting 
in which it functions, when formal institutions are 
weak, agents are more propitious to look after their 
own benefits (Lien, Teng, & Li, 2016). Good Corporate 
Governance schemes reduce the presence of agency 
costs. 
What can the companies do to ensure that their 
choices are aimed to enhance outcomes for the stake-
holders? Despite all the previously done research in 
what is considered best practices, there is no empirical 
information available on the matter regarding Board 
Size, Gender Diversity, and Multiple Directorship for 
companies operating in SIDS. It is therefore important 
to understand the influence of these Corporate Gover-
nance arrangements on bank performance for this 
particular context. 
In summary, the objective of this study is to analyze 
through the lens of agency theory the relationship 
between Supervisory Board Size, Gender Diversity, 
and Multiple Directorships on performance in the 
banking industry of Curacao, which as of today has 
not been empirically studied in the island. Throughout 
this study we will take a closer look at these Corporate 
Governance practices and how they relate to bank 
performance in this context. This study will further 
add to international literature and research on Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS). Most of the available 
information concerns Europe or the United States of 
America (USA), which are big economies, while island 
states represent the smallest economies in the world 
(Kurecic, Luburic, & Kozina, 2017). Furthermore, this 
study will help to create awareness in the financial 
sector on the potency of ‘good governance’ in a local 
context. The findings of this research are of importance 
to the supervisory board of directors, top management, 
shareholders, regulators, customers, auditors, and 
other stakeholders.
Information was captured from the annual reports 
of local banks and their subsidiaries. Results obtained 
through linear regression analysis, using the ordinary 
least squares method, indicate that there is a negative 
association between Board Size and Gender Diver-
sity on Bank Performance. On the contrary, Multiple 
Directorships positively relate with banks’ outcomes. 
According to national regulations in Curacao, a 
minimum of three Supervisory Board members are 
recommended for insurance companies and credit 
institutions (Centrale Bank, 2001), but there is no 
indication regarding a maximum number of members. 
Furthermore, there are neither Gender Diversity 
requirements nor regulation on Multiple Directorships. 
These findings can provide new insights to incorporate 
in the legislation and improve bank performance.
The rest of this study is organized as follows: section 
2 deals with the literature review and hypotheses 
formulation; section 3 refers to the data, variables, and 
methodology employed in the study; section 4 presents 
results from the data analysis; and section 5 concludes 
and provides recommendations for further research.
2. Literature review 
This section elaborates on literature concerning 
key variables of this study, namely: Corporate Gover-
nance, Firm Performance, Gender Diversity, Board 
Size, and Multiple Directorships. The latter will sustain 
the importance of conducting a study about Corporate 
Governance and Bank Performance for the banking 
industry of Curacao.
2.1 Corporate Governance background
Over the past three decades, Corporate Governance 
became a global topic and has caught the attention of ma-
ny governments, corporations, academic experts, banks, 
regulators, international organizations, and investors. 
Due to the great amount of research done in Corporate 
Governance, in 2009 the Social Science Research Net-
work introduced the Corporate Governance Network with 
more than 20 related electronic journals. 
In 1999, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) launched its first Principles 
of Corporate Governance, these principles became an 
international benchmark for many corporations, inves-
tors, policy makers, and other stakeholders to attain good 
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Corporate Governance (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). The OECD 
Principles became available to both members and non-
members and were updated in 2004 and revised in 2015; 
their intention is to build on know-how and experience of 
companies, policy makers, regulators, and stakeholders 
(OECD, 2017). 
2.2 Corporate Governance
 Corporate Governance, in its broad sense, refers to 
ways in which companies are directed and controlled. 
Good Corporate Governance practices maximize firm 
value, avoiding expropriation of stakeholders. This 
concept plays an important role in guaranteeing proper 
management of all companies, and particularly for big, 
multinational, and private sector corporations (Diacon 
& O’Sullivan, 1995; Kose & Senbet, 1998). It is a means 
to avoid corporate scandals such as the ones that led 
to the financial crisis back in 2008. The increasing im-
portance of Corporate Governance has subsequently 
sparked the interest in empirical evidence by many 
agents in the business world, which could be useful 
to enhancing foremost firm performance. Although 
the increased level of importance is greatly noticeable 
across research, it is remarkable that the concept of 
Corporate Governance is defined differently across 
industries and professions. While some use the agency 
theory as a foundation to define the concept, originally 
focusing on the interest of the shareholders, other 
researchers have created different multi-stakeholder 
frameworks. 
Agency theory was introduced by Berle and Means 
(1932), expanded by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Fama and Jensen (1983), and further developed by Bai-
man (1982) and Eisenhardt (1989). It is argued that the 
agent-principal conflict takes place as executives and 
shareholders have different objectives; shareholders 
look after profits, while executives search mostly for 
personal gains. From the agency perspective, it is 
believed that Corporate Governance is the instrument 
by which the acts of the agents (e.g., managers) are 
supervised and held to fairly enhance profits and 
shareholders’ profits (L’Huillier, 2014; Mitton, 2002). 
Naseem, Zhang, Malik and Rehman (2017) and Nelson 
(2005) also agree that Corporate Governance entails 
the laws, regulations, and other factors that are applied 
to control operational activities of a company, in efforts 
to ensure investors a return on their investment.
Based on what has been previously said, in this 
paper Corporate Governance is understood as ways 
to direct and control organizations such that profita-
bility is achieved without expropriating stakeholders. 
It consists of three aspects: explicit and implicit 
contracts, reconciling procedures, and supervision 
procedures. The first ones are created in order to 
establish the distribution of responsibilities, rights, 
and rewards; the second are created to manage the 
conflict of interest that may arise between the company 
and stakeholders according to their duties, privileges, 
and roles; and the last one entails proper management 
of control, monitoring, and information flow.
2.3 Basel Committee’s Guiding Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance
The Basel Committee’s Guiding Principles (2015b) 
are established in the Corporate Governance Guidance 
Notes for the Supervisory Boards of Supervised Financial 
Institutions, there is a total of 13 principles in its contents 
and these relate to “board’s overall performance, board 
qualifications and compositions, board’s own structure 
and practices, senior management, governance of group 
structures, risk management functions, risk identifi-
cation, monitoring and controlling, risk communication, 
compliance, internal audit, compensation, disclosure 
and transparency, and the role of supervisors” (Basel 
Committee’s Guiding Principles, 2015b, p. 3). All these 
principles are intended to help banks and supervisors 
in achieving robust and transparent risk management 
and decision-making and at the same time ensure public 
trust, safety, and soundness of the banking sector. For 
this study, attention will be paid to principle number 3: 
board’s own structure and practices, which concerns the 
organization and assessment of the board, and how it 
deals with conflicts of interest (Basel Committee, 2015b).
The implementation of good Corporate Governance 
among financial institutions in Curacao is mainly 
supervised by the Central Bank of Curacao and Sint 
Maarten (Centrale Bank, 2001). The Central Bank has 
adopted the guiding principles of good Corporate Gover-
nance of the Basel Committee as stipulated in their “…
admission requirements for local and international 
banks and its Corporate Governance Guidance Notes 
for the Supervisory Boards of Supervised Financial 
Institutions” (Matroos-Lasten, 2019, p. 1), aiming to 
promote stability, integrity, efficiency, safety, and 
soundness of the financial sector in Curacao and in 
Sint Maarten. These guidelines include the interest of 
stakeholders of the banks and other credit companies. 
The Central Bank has chosen to use the two-tier board 
model as a control point, although the General Law 
of Curacao allows a one-tier Board. The regulations 
formulated regarding the admission requirements for 
local and international banks, basically specify what 
local banks should comply with in order to enter and 
remain active in the sector. The Corporate Governance 
Guidance Notes for the Supervisory Boards of Super-
vised Financial Institutions contain the grounds on which 
banks are being supervised to ensure proper mana-
gement of profitability for shareholders and at the same 
time proper management of third-party funding. Since 
banks are basically using third party’s (public) funding 
to finance their lending activity and generate return on 
investment for their shareholders, regulation is quite 
strict.
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2.3.1. Organization and assessment of the board. 
The Basel Committee mentions that the board 
should continuously work on its own structure, in 
terms of leadership, size, the use of committees, and 
devices to solve conflict of interests. In order to ensure 
a desirable performance of the board as a whole and 
each member individually, a regular assessment should 
be conducted. Then, aspects like the structure, size and 
composition, suitability of each member, effectiveness 
of board’s governance are reviewed with the intention 
of improving board performance (Basel Committee, 
2015b).
2.3.2. Conflict of interest. 
The Basel Committee suggests that “The board 
should oversee the implementation and operation of 
policies to identify potential conflicts of interest” (Basel 
Committee, 2015b, p. 18). Hence, the board should 
have a policy with regards to conflict of interests and 
an objective compliance process for this policy. It 
stipulates that members should at all times avoid any 
type of activities that are or appear to be a conflict 
of interest. Banks should be aware of situations in 
which conflict of interest could arise, make a rigorous 
review and implement an approval process (e.g., when 
a board member wants to serve on another board). 
Promptly, there should be an emphasis on disclosure 
duties, responsibility to abstain from voting, adequate 
procedures for transactions, and non-compliance 
consequences.
2.4 Firm performance in the banking industry.
Similar to Corporate Governance, there is also a lack 
of consensus when it comes to defining the concept of 
Firm Performance. Despite the differences of opinions 
about its definition, it is evident that performance is 
operationalized by many researchers and practitioners 
based on financial and non-financial determinants.
Selvam, Gayathri, Vasanth, Lingaraja and Marxiaoli 
(2016) developed a model of possible determinants of 
Firm Performance. In their study they indicated that 
there are nine determinants that should be conside-
red; three of these determinants are finance related, 
namely: profitability, market value, and growth. While 
the non-financial determinants involve “employee satis-
faction, customer satisfaction, environmental perfor-
mance, environmental audit performance, corporate 
governance, and social performance” (Selvam et al., 
2016, p. 96).
According to Taouab and Issor (2019), it is vital to 
continuously assess and measure Firm Performance, 
since it is what determines to what extent companies 
are able to develop, progress, and remain competitive; to 
survive an ever-changing and competitive environment, 
companies should continuously keep track of their 
performance. The criteria used for assessing perfor-
mance are productivity, growth, return, profitability, fle-
xibility, and institutionalization (Taouab & Issor, 2019). 
Firm Performance is the result of a company's aptitude 
to competently exploit the limited available resources to 
attain its aims, it deals with competitiveness, efficiency, 
and effectiveness of the organization. 
According to Munir (2015), Firm Performance can be 
understood as financial stability or financial health. The 
construct is measured by means of Return on Equity, 
Return on Assets, profit margin, sales, capital ade-
quacy, liquidity ratio, and stock prices, among others. It 
mainly depends on the industry for which it should be 
considered. In the banking industry stock prices, cash 
flows, revenues, and operating income are widely used 
to monitor performance (Munir, 2015). Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) are two commonly 
used performance ratios to analyze banks´ financial 
statements (Maverick, 2019); ROA specifies how much 
a company earns on its assets; ROE is a measure that 
expresses how effectively management is using its 
company´s assets/ investments in order to generate 
profits. Late in the 1970´s, ROE became one of the 
preferred performance metrics, as it communicates 
shareholders how well the company is using their 
investment (Ralph , 2015).
Banks performance depends on several variables, 
including Corporate Governance schemes. In this 
research, special attention is given to the relationship 
between performance and board composition of the 
Supervisory Board: Gender Diversity, Board Size, and 
Multiple Directorships. 
2.5 Gender diversity and performance
Cultural factors play a vital role in achieving or 
overlooking board gender diversity goals (Devillard, 
Sancier-Sultan, & Werner, 2014). Each company has a 
corporate culture which may present some challenges 
in supporting women on top management or board 
positions. The survey of Devillard et al. (2014) indicates 
the challenges women face on their journey to top 
level management in today’s world; although many 
studies have shown that women are able to lead as 
effectively as men do, the truth is that women are still 
underrepresented in top level management due to the 
lack of support.
According to Abdelzaher and Abdelzaher (2019) the 
effects of Gender Diversity on the outcomes of boards 
remain an issue, since female participation at Board 
of Directors is much less frequent, compared to their 
male counterparts. This is also highlighted in a recent 
paper by Watkins-Fassler and Rodríguez-Ariza (2019) 
for Mexican companies listed during 2001-2015, as 
female board members on average accounted only for 
4% of boards. Therefore, it is important to continue 
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studying the firm value that is created (or not) with 
higher presence of females. These authors were able 
to provide empirical evidence that shows that the-
re is a positive significant association between the 
percentage of women on boards and firm value, which 
was measured by Return on Equity (ROE). Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) also agree that there is a positive and 
significant relation between Gender Diversity and 
Firm Performance. These researchers noted that this 
effect comes to play only when more than two women 
are part of the board. It has been claimed that gender 
diversity can raise value and reduce agency costs, since 
women tend to monitor better than men by having a 
higher inclination towards asking questions. In addition, 
women ś presence on boards enlarges companies´ 
competitive advantages as a result of their superior 
market perspective and optimistic image on the clients 
(Ramón-Llorens, García-Meca, & Duréndez, 2017). 
Poletti-Hughes and Briano-Turrent (2019) showed that 
females on Latin American companies´ boards tend 
to stimulate more risk-taking and consequently obtain 
better expected returns. In addition, women differ and 
supplement men in their capabilities and skills, which 
stimulate performance (Kirsch, 2018). 
In contrast to the studies which find evidence that 
support the positive relationship between Gender 
Diversity and Firm Performance, other investigations 
conclude that there is no significant relationship 
(Darmadi, 2011), or that this association is negative. It 
has been argued that women tend to have less mana-
gerial and board experience than men, diminishing 
their potentially positive impact on performance (Dang, 
Nguyen, & Vo, 2014). In addition, some authors conclude 
that females have an inclination to be more risk-averse 
than males, which limits the pursuit of higher (and 
riskier) expected value projects (Amorós, Etchebarne, 
Torres-Zapata, & Felzensztein, 2016).
According to the Central Bureau of Statistics Cura-
çao (2019), the participation of men in management 
positions is slightly higher than that of women. A total of 
23853 men between the ages of 25-65 have some form 
of managerial position, while there are 19743 women 
in the same condition (45% of the total). In addition, 
the total employed population of women on average is 
higher (by 2124 individuals) than that of men (Central 
Bureau of Statistics Curacao, 2018). In light of the above, 
it can be stated that women play an active and relevant 
role in Curacao ś business environment. In line with the 
agency theory, it is proposed that:
• H1: Gender diversity in the supervisory board has a 
positive relation with banks performance in Curacao.
2.6 Board size and performance
There are many studies concerning the relationship 
between Board Size and Firm Performance. Many argue 
that a large board harms the performance of the firm, 
as it is more difficult to make decisions (Uwuigbe & 
Fakile, 2012). Others believe that smaller boards are 
less effective and diminish firm’s performance, as their 
control spectrum is reduced (Guest, 2009).
Investigating the effect of Board Size on Firm Per-
formance is very important to determine the extent 
to which management can be properly supervised to 
mitigate agency problems. There seems to be better 
communication between directors and management 
in smaller boards (Yermack, 1996), which positively 
impacts monitoring and performance. Lin and Lee 
(2008) have also pointed out that smaller boards are 
preferred due to the easiness with which they tend 
to reach consensus, which speeds up the decision-
making process, increases efficiency of the board 
and effectiveness of the firm. However, authors like 
Badu and Appiah (2017) find that there is a positive 
significant relationship between Board Size and Firm 
Performance. They suggest, from the principal-agent 
perspective, that bigger boards allow more monitoring 
in order to improve Firm Performance. Other resear-
chers, such as Topak (2011), conclude that there is 
actually no relationship between Board Size and Firm 
Performance. 
Banks on the island of Curacao tend to operate on 
a smaller scale compared to large international banks 
and may not need a large board to work and monitor 
efficiently. The decision-making process on Curacao is 
known, in the eyes of the public, to be relatively lethargic 
and may be affecting the overall performance of the firm. 
Bigger boards might be more complicated to manage in 
the island; therefore, this study will test the following 
hypothesis:
• H2: Supervisory board size has a negative relation 
with banks performance in Curacao.
2.7 Multiple directorships and performance
With respect to Multiple Directorships, there are few 
countries that dictate recommendations on this regard. 
For example, in Malaysia, Multiple Directorship is one of 
the concerns related to Director Commitments within 
the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance. In the 
Bursa Malaysia Practice notes, listed companies are 
allowed a maximum of 25 simultaneous directorships, 
10 in publicly listed companies and 15 in non – publicly 
listed companies. This is very different compared to the 
US recommendation, in which it is advised for a director 
to have three or less simultaneous directorship roles 
(Securities Comission Malaysia, 2017). In Curacao, Multi-
ple Directorship is not strictly regulated. 
A director that agrees to be part of more than one 
board automatically enters a fiduciary relationship with 
all companies involved. Furthermore, this person owes 
all companies identical duties of care and loyalty. The 
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duties of care and loyalty are meant to reduce agency 
costs and basically involve the degree to which the board 
member will act in benefit of the corporation without 
putting personal or third party’s interests first. Based 
on the literature, it can be said that many studies point 
out the costs of having board members with Multiple 
Directorships since it may weaken active monitoring, 
and this may negatively impact Firm Performance 
(Chen, 2008). Multiple Directorships bring forward Bu-
sy Boards, which deteriorate Corporate Governance by 
overstretching directors, with a negative effect on the 
decision-making process and Firm Performance (Fich 
& Shivdasani, 2006). On the other hand, some authors 
argue that it has a positive effect by improving access to 
relevant information and other valuable resources that 
help firms to adapt and reduce uncertainty concerning 
strategic actions (Howard, Withers, & Tithanyi, 2016; 
Watkins-Fassler, Fernández-Pérez, & Rodríguez-Ariza, 
2016).
Chen (2008) concludes that in “firms with high growth 
opportunities (likely having greater needs for advising 
and finance) and low agency conflicts (likely having less 
need for monitoring), Multiple Directorships could be 
a source of beneficial advising, which improves board 
functions and Firm Performance. In contrast, in firms 
with low growth opportunities (lower need for advising 
and finance) and high agency conflicts (more need 
for monitoring), Multiple Directorships can undercut 
effective monitoring by outside directors and therefore 
can negatively affect Firm Performance” (Chen, 2008, p. 
25-26).
On the island of Curacao there may be limits as to 
the number of professionals available to occupy a role 
within the Supervisory Board of a bank with the rele-
vant experience and knowledge to monitor properly, 
reduce agency costs, and dictate effective strategic 
lines. Additionally, there are not many financial ins-
titutions compared to more developed countries. 
Because all financial institutions are supervised by 
the Central Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten, the 
regulatory requirements for all banks are the same, 
therefore, it is predicted that:
• H3: Multiple directorships in supervisory boards 
have a positive relation with banks performance in 
Curacao.
3. Method
3.1 Sample and data
In order to analyze the interconnection between 
Board Size, Gender Diversity, and Multiple Director-
ship on Bank Performance, this study made use of 
data drawn from annual reports of supervised locally 
generated banks. The banks considered were APC 
Bank, Banco di Caribe, Maduro & Curiel´s Bank, Orco 
Bank, The Windward Islands Bank, and Vidanova Bank. 
The annual reports published online by the Central 
Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten and banks´ web-
sites provided all the necessary information for this 
research. This type of data collection was chosen as 
the information was easily accessible to the public. The 
study integrated locally generated banks on the island 
of Curacao and their subsidiaries, where one bank was 
excluded due to lack of information. Then, the total 
sample corresponds to 5 banks and their information 
was captured for the period 2004-2018. 
3.2 Variables
Independent variables used in this study are Board 
Size, Gender Diversity, and Multiple Directorships. As 
the two-tier board system is implemented in the banks 
under study, by board we refer to the Supervisory 
Board. Board Size corresponds to the total number of 
directors per year on each board of the financial insti-
tutions studied. This is the usual way to compute Board 
Size, as implemented by authors such as Toxqui and 
Watkins-Fassler (2016) and Melville and Merendino 
(2019). Gender diversity is calculated as the proportion 
of female directors represented (seated) on each board 
(per year) (Watkins-Fassler & Rodríguez-Ariza, 2019). 
Multiple Directorships indicate if a director (or direc-
tors) of one bank simultaneously occupies a seat at the 
board of directors of another bank or banks. This is 
expressed through a dummy variable, being 1 if there is 
Multiple Directorships and 0 if this is not the case. This 
operational definition has been employed in previous 
studies, such as in Watkins-Fassler et al. (2016). 
The dependent variable used in this study is Firm 
(Bank) Performance. It is measured using both Return 
on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). ROA is 
calculated by dividing the bank’s net income by its total 
assets. ROE is calculated by dividing the bank’s net 
income by the total shareholders´ equity.
Control variables employed in this study are Bank 
Size and Leverage. Bank Size is expressed as the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage measures 
the bank’s total debt over equity. 
3.3 Methodology
The linear regression model has been used to ana-
lyze the quantitative data collected for this study. This 
type of modeling technique has been chosen because 
it establishes the statistically significant relationships 
between dependent and independent variables, and the 
strengths of these relationships. 
The main equation employed for the regression 
analysis is the following:
(1)
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where P represents the dependent variables ROA and 
ROE,  is the intercept or constant term, BS stands for 
the independent variable Board Size, GD represents the 
independent variable Gender Diversity, MD corresponds 
to the independent variable Multiple Directorship, S is 
the control variable Bank Size, L represents the control 
variable Leverage, μ is the error term, and subscripts і and 
t correspond to the bank and time (year). 
4. Data analysis and results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive analysis of the independent, 
dependent, and control variables is shown in Table 1. 
An average Board Size of 11 members has been found 
for the sample of banks over the period 2004-2018, 
with a minimum number of 5 directors and maximum 
of 17. Multiple Directorships are present on average 
in 56% of the cases, which constitutes a relatively 
common practice. It is interesting to notice that the 
maximum number of boards where a director simulta-
neously participates is 2, which reduces the busy 
board considerations. Regarding Gender Diversity, it is 
worth to observe that although females in Curacao do 
occupy executive positions (Central Bureau of Statistics 
Curaçao, 2018), it is less frequent to find women on 
boards. On average, female participation in supervi-
sory boards constitute only 14%. Some banks do not 
include women on their boards, while the highest female 
representation in a supervisory board corresponds to 
38%. 
Regarding the dependent variables ROA and ROE, 
mean values are 3% and 18%, respectively. In two occa-
sions there appears to be negative ROA values; in the 
case of ROE, this happens only once. 
 Furthermore, the control variable Leverage reports 
an average value of 9.96. Generally, Leverage shows 
a positive sign, except for one time, where the value 
corresponds to -11.30. This finding can be explained 
through the bank ś acquisition of an investment with 
borrowed funds (with higher interest rates compared 
to the investment return). Finally, Bank Size reports an 
average value of 14.60.
4.2 Regression analysis
For the regression analysis the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) method is used, which aims to minimize 
the sum of the squared residuals. In order to check 
that the estimators are BLUE (Best Linear Unbia-
sed Estimators), tests for multicollinearity, heteros-
cedasticity, autocorrelation, and normality of residuals 
were performed. Robust standard errors were emplo-
yed in the regression analysis.
Multicollinearity implies that there are relation-
ships between the explanatory variables. When pre-
sent, it makes it difficult to estimate the parameters 
with precision and determine the effect of each 
individual variable. Large standard errors are obtained 
and therefore low t-statistics. So, coefficients tend to be 
not significant in spite of high R2 values. Nevertheless, 
the OLS method is still useful when multicollinearity 
(not perfect) is present, OLS estimators remain BLUE. 
It is possible to check for multicollinearity using the 
correlation matrix, as it can be observed in table 2, the 
correlations are low.
Another assumption underlying OLS estimation is 
that error terms for all observations have the same 
variance; otherwise, heteroscedasticity is present. 
Although OLS is still consistent and R2 remains the 
same, heteroscedasticity produces biased standard 
errors and the variances of parameters are no lon-
ger minimized (OLS is not BLUE). Therefore, it is 
more probable to reject hypotheses due to smaller 
t-values (coefficients that appear to be significant may 
in fact be insignificant). To detect heteroscedasticity, 
the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test can be employed. 
The null hypothesis is that heteroscedasticity is not 
present. In this case, the p-value attained using ROA 
as the dependent variable is 0.23 (0.16 when using 
ROE); therefore, the presence of heteroscedasticity is 
rejected at a 10% significance level.
Regarding autocorrelation, when present it 
indicates a relationship of the residuals between 
periods; with it, biased estimators in small samples 
are obtained. With large samples OLS is still 
consistent; however, standard errors are biased 
(confidence intervals are wider and it is then easier 
to reject a hypothesis), therefore, coefficients that 
appear to be significant may in fact be insignificant. 
We also overestimate R2. Autocorrelation can be 
analyzed using the LM Test. The null hypothesis is that 
there is no serial correlation. In this case, the p-value 
obtained using ROA is 0.34 (0.19 when using ROE); 
therefore, the presence of autocorrelation is rejected 
at a 10% significance level.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Independent Variables
BS 10.93 3.66 5.00 17.00
MD 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
# of MD 0.83 0.81 0.00 2.00
GD 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.38
Dependent Variables
ROA 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.06
ROE 0.18 1.27 -7.46 1.52
Control Variables
S 14.60 0.96 12.91 15.89
L 9.96 7.33 -11.30 43.01
Source: own elaboration.
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To test for the normality of residuals, it is possible 
to use the Jarque-Bera test. The null hypothesis is 
that residuals are normally distributed. The p-value 
obtained for this test when ROA is the dependent 
variable is 0.32; therefore, residuals are normally 
distributed at a 10% significance level. On the other 
hand, when the dependent variable is ROE, the p-value 
for the Jarque-Bera test is 0.03 and normality of 
residuals is rejected. The major implication of this 
is that it is harder to make accurate forecasts with 
the model (which is not the intention of this study). 
Econometric results are shown in table 3.
Econometric results manifest that Gender Diver-
sity reduces banks performance. As the participation 
of females on boards increases, ROA drops sharply. 
When considering ROE as the performance variable, 
there also appears to be a negative (but not signi-
ficant) effect of Gender Diversity. In addition, re-
gression analysis shows that Board Size negatively 
relates with performance. As Board Size increases, 
ROE significantly declines. When considering ROA 
as the performance measure, this negative effect 
is not statistically significant. Regarding Multiple 
Directorships, it is evident that they have a positive 
association with performance, which is significant 
both for ROA and ROE. On the other hand, the effect 
of leverage on banks performance is ambiguous, 
as for ROA the relationship is positive and for ROE 
negative, being significant in both cases. Finally, bank 
size negatively relates with performance, particularly 
when considering ROE.
Table 2. Correlation matrix
BS GD MD L S
BS 1.00 0.22 0.15 -0.12 0.28
GD 0.22 1.00 -0.06 -0.14 0.12
MD 0.15 -0.06 1.00 0.33 0.10
L -0.12 -0.14 0.33 1.00 -0.01
S 0.28 0.12 0.10 -0.01 1.00
Source: own elaboration.



























*Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% 
level. t-statistics are in parenthesis
Source: own elaboration. 
5. Conclusions
Results indicate that Gender Diversity has a ne-
gative effect on banks performance. This contradicts 
the first hypothesis of the study: Gender Diversity 
in the supervisory board has a positive relation with 
banks performance in Curacao. It should be noticed 
that this hypothesis is based on the fact that in Cura-
cao women play active roles in executive positions. 
Nevertheless, it was found in the investigation that 
very few females participate as supervisory board 
members. Therefore, this result is in line with the 
literature that link women´s lack of directorship ex-
perience with poor companies´ performance (Dang et 
al., 2014). It does not mean that women should not 
participate in boards; on the contrary, greater female 
exposure in supervisory boards will eventually pro-
vide them with the necessary skills and expertise to 
boost firm performance. Compared to men, women 
tend to ask more questions and monitor better, which 
reduces agency problems and improves performance 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Therefore, in order to 
increase the participation of females on bank boards 
in Curacao (which also applies to other latitudes), and 
thus increase their experience in these positions, it 
would be convenient to incorporate quotas for women 
in the legislation.
With regards to Board Size, there is empirical 
evidence to support the second hypothesis of this 
research: Supervisory Board Size has a negative 
relation with banks performance in Curacao. Cura-
cao´s business scale is relatively small so banks do 
not require a large board to monitor and function 
efficiently. The decision-making process is more 
effective with smaller boards, which is reflected in 
higher performance (Yermack, 1996). Management 
can be better supervised to mitigate agency problems 
with small boards that operate more fluently (Lin & 
Lee, 2008). In this respect, it would be convenient 
that the Central Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten 
introduce in its rules a maximum number of members 
for banks´ Supervisory boards. 
Finally, results show that Multiple Directorships 
are associated with higher ROA and ROE, in line with 
hypothesis 3: Multiple Directorships in Supervisory 
boards have a positive relation with banks performance 
in Curacao. It was observed that the maximum number 
of simultaneous directorship seats taken by the same 
person is two, which abolishes the arguments of busy 
boards and their negative impact on firm performan-
ce. On the contrary, Multiple Directorships provide 
locally generated banks in Curacao with valuable 
human capital and other resources, which favor 
decision-making processes and reduce information 
asymmetries and agency costs (Watkins-Fassler et 
al., 2016). In this respect, Central Banks – including 
the Central Bank of Curacao and Sint Maarten - 
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should dictate recommendations concerning Multiple 
Directorships. 
It is important for SIDS to establish a complete best 
practice guide for the banking industry, to promote its 
growth, sustainability, and generate better conditions 
for the economy as a whole. It is also recommended 
that banks at SIDS evaluate their current situation 
regarding their Corporate Governance schemes and 
determine the best practices they should adopt, 
particularly related to board composition. 
This study presents some limitations; it was res-
tricted to a limited number of Financial Institutions 
and periods of time in only one Small Island Develop-
ing State: Curacao. The findings may differ if a larger 
data set is used, and more SIDS are included. In addi-
tion, not all variables influencing banks performance 
have been considered in this study, qualitative aspects 
of performance were not addressed at all. Finally, the 
study didn´t address the optimum size of the board, 
the optimum number of boards where a director 
should simultaneously participate, nor the optimum 
percentage of females on bank boards. Future re-
search can take the latter into account. 
The present study can be expanded to include 
other types of firms, not only locally generated banks. 
Given the importance of Corporate Governance for 
company performance, and the lack of research do-
ne in this area for corporates operating in SIDS, it is 
worth conducting further studies and expanding the 
island sample. Understanding which variables are 
relevant to have effective and efficient supervisory 
boards of directors in this particular context is vital 
in order to offer specific corporate recommendations 
and contribute to the economic development of SIDS. 
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